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Briefly Noted

Linus Pauling, Two-Time Nobel Prize Winner

The Nobel Peace Prize Committee of the Norwegian parliament (Storting) announced on 10 October that the 1962 Peace Prize, previously unawarded, would go to Dr. Linus Carl Pauling of the California Institute of Technology, while the 1963 Peace Prize would be divided between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies, both with headquarters in Geneva. Pauling had previously won the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1954.

The reasons for the prize awards will not be announced until December, but the Storting's Committee may have believed that Pauling was largely responsible for the conclusion of the nuclear test ban treaty, which also went into effect on 10 October. Using the status gained by his first Nobel prize, Pauling for years conducted a crusade against nuclear testing, circulating his petitions; according to Louis Budenz, he was unacknowledged CP member in the 1940's. On the other hand, he denounced the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in 1961. The public often fails to realize that Pauling's scientific knowledge in the field of chemistry--he originated a theory on molecular bonds which was, incidentally, rejected by many Soviet scientists on Marxist-Leninist grounds--does not make him an expert on genetics, radiology, or nuclear physics. When Pauling said in 1953 that Carbon 14 was more dangerous than Strontium 90, Dr. Robert R. Newell, a Professor Emeritus of Radiology at Stanford, remarked: "It is not informative to compare two different elements and their two different results.... It would take a thousand such bombs to double the present world level of Carbon 14...." In December 1960, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists commented on Pauling: "To the mature knowledgeable person, his oversimplifications and unqualified absolutes tend to seem irresponsible." It was not Pauling's activity which induced the US and UK governments to propose in 1959, 1961, and 1962 the test ban which has now been agreed on.

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While we have little sympathy for Pauling, a denun-

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21 October 1963

DATES

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7 Nov October Revolution. Lenin and Trotsky seize power from the Provisional Government, 1917.

10 Nov World Youth Day (Communist).

10 Nov Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEF0), Djakarta 10-17 Nov 1963.

11 Nov International Student Week 11-17 November, concluding with International Students Day on the 17th (International Union of Students, Communist).

14 Nov (China-Russia) Treaty of Peking cedes Chinese "Great Northeast" to Russia, 1860.

15 Nov Bolsheviks proclaim "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," affirming principle of self-determination to peoples of the former Empire, 1917.

30 Nov USSR attacks Finland, 1939.

December Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-operation, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi, 1963.

5 Dec USSR adopts new "Stalin" constitution providing for universal suffrage, freedom of speech, press and assembly, 1936.

20 Dec UN issues second call for Tibetan Freedom, 1953.

27 Dec Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty arrested, Hungary, 1948.

January International Conference of Youth and Students for Disarmament (WFDY-sponsored); Florence, Italy, January 1964.

2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba, 1959. U.S. recognizes Government 7 Jan 1959; U.S. terminates diplomatic and consular relations 3 Jan 1961.

15 Jan "Trial of the 12" first show trial of Stalinist purge, including Zinoviev and Kamenev (initial members Stalin ruling triumvirate during Lenin's physical decline), 1935.

21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (born 22 April 1870).

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COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#14

28 September-11 October 1963

Commentary

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS:

1. This period brought a mounting wave of actions and "reports by informed sources" indicating that a Soviet campaign to isolate the Chinese Communists and, if necessary, excommunicate them from the movement is being pushed vigorously. Key statement was a 38-page article in the CPSU's central theoretical journal Kommunist, "The General Line of the Chinese Leadership," which observers termed Moscow's most sweeping denunciation yet of the Chicom's "wrong, harmful and dangerous activities," and which appeared to lay the foundation for outlawing the CCP from the WCM. It stated flatly that "the pernicious theoretical platform and political line of the Chinese leadership are incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and alien in character to the general line of the international Communist movement."

2. Perhaps a clearer indication of Moscow's intent was found in Pravda's giving half a page to a statement by the obscure CP of Paraguay which declared that fence sitting on the issue is no longer possible, that Mao's dogmatism has become the chief danger to the WCM, and that the 1960 Moscow Declaration (which had put revisionism in first place) should be amended to reflect this, "possibly by adopting an additional declaration" (which would mean a new conference). It went on to state that "political isolation of the splitters remains the only way to preserve unity."

3. Reports that the major Soviet-aligned CP's would meet in Moscow immediately after the 7 November celebration of the Soviet Revolution anniversary to prepare for a new "world Communist conference" seemed to be confirmed by the French CP's plenary session on 6 October, including Pravda's publication of Thorez' speech ("We shall decisively support the convocation of the forthcoming international conference, which will again confirm the principles of policy of the Communist Movement.") (See Chronology - October 6). "Informed sources" have also reported "secret trips" of Hungarian boss Kadar and delegates of other CP's to confer with Khrushchev on this subject in recent weeks. The Italian CP's publication of its comprehensive reply to and denunciation of the Chinese line and actions (Chronology - September 29)-- while adding nothing new to the polemics -- may well have been intended to prepare for such a showdown.

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...a couple of highly appraised but

~~SECRET~~ (#14 Commentary Cont.)

[REDACTED] of leading ideologists of [REDACTED] determined to formulate an ideological position of both the CPSU and the CCP." An overt initiative in this direction was made in July by Netherlands CP chief De Groot in a speech published in Party organ Die Waarheid on 19 July 1963, (translated in TICD No. 476, JPES 20601, dtd 12 August 1963). De Groot specifically proposed "That we first of all strengthen our contacts with the parties in the capitalist countries and come out for a separate international council of those parties."

5. The Chinese, engrossed in full exploitation of their 14th anniversary 1 October, added nothing to the battle of words beyond complaining resentfully at the slurs of "modern revisionists" who "are most elated in teasing the Chinese people for being very poor." The Albanians finally published a massive reply to the 14 July CPSU open letter which contained a few quotable passages.

6. Recent weeks have been the important, "neutral" Indonesian CP apparently slipping further in the Chinese direction. (Chronology - September 23, and several classified reports).

7. Castro continued to maintain his stance of a "neutrality" which seemed to favor the Chinese, even flaunting Cuba's pose of indecision on the test-ban treaty in a 23 September speech.

8. Among the fronts, the Chinese-boycotted shipborne "Third World Meeting of Journalists," sponsored by the Soviet-supported International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists (ICJ), concluded with a moderate communique in tune with the Soviet line; and the Soviet Afro-Asian Trade Union Conference, "attacking the Chinese efforts to exclude "Soviet workers" and the WFTU and insisting on participation by all national and international trade union centers wishing to take part.

Significance:

The initiative remained largely on the Soviet side during this period, with strong evidence that the CPSU leaders and their principal supporters have decided that the time is now ripe (particularly in view of broad support of the USSR's role in the test-ban treaty) to push for a well-prepared conference of the World Communist Movement which would endorse the Soviet line as the general line of the WCM by an "overwhelming majority," thus confronting the Chinese and their supporters with the alternative of excommunicating themselves if they do not support this "general line."

Despite this apparent Soviet progress in power politics, however, the Chinese seemed to be exerting a continuing ideological attraction on a number of the most important "neutral" parties, including the Indonesian, which seemed to be slipping gradually into the Chicom camp, and the Cuban, despite its daily dependence on heavy Soviet aid for its very existence. Classified reports during this period described increasing strength and disruptive activities of pro-Chicom elements within Communist and extreme left organizations in Chile and Ceylon, among others. The danger of the Chinese appeal, "as they play the cards of hunger and backwardness with one hand and radical Marxism with the other," was emphasized by Beirut's pro-Baathist newspaper Al Kifah in an 13 September editorial prompted by the "bitter Chinese attacks against the Soviet Union" at the AAPSO Executive Conference in Cyprus (see PG #12). The writer, Maurice Saqr, stated that the Chinese arguments seem logical from the Marxist point of view, especially to the deprived masses of the underdeveloped countries, and called the danger of Chinese Communist infiltration in these areas both "immediate and great." (Saqr's answer to the Chinese danger: a program of massive assistance (presumably Soviet) to raise the standard of living of the masses in the underdeveloped nations!)

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#14

28 September-11 October 1963

September 28 - Izvestiya publishes an article by I. Kvaskov on the anti-Soviet hysteria being whipped up in China by the Chinese leaders. In Dalniy, where "Soviet ships are repaired under the Soviet-Chinese trade agreement, and where, naturally their crews have to stay," signs appeared on the doors of clubs reading in Russian: "Foreigners not allowed." "What is happening in Dalniy is unheard-of in relations between socialist countries."

The 1963 annual supplement to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia carries a freshly re-written article on China reflecting the changes in relations over the past year as it depicts everything as going badly there. Whereas last year the Encyclopedia attributed China's difficulties to natural calamities alone, they are now due to: (1) the unrealistic "great leap forward" policy practiced since 1958; (2) China's loosening of economic ties with the USSR and other socialist countries; and (3) China's refusal to participate in international socialist division of labor and insistence on relying on its own forces. The article also expands considerably over last year's brief treatment of the "large ethnic minorities" in the CPR, with particular attention to the Turkic language group in the areas adjoining Soviet Central Asia.

September 29 - The Italian CP daily l'Unita carries a special 16-page supplement headed, "We and the Chinese Comrades, Texts and Comments on the Divergencies with the Chinese Communist Party." The introduction traces the history of "the Chinese attack against the line followed by the majority of the Communist Parties" to its "peak of bitterness" during the Cuban crisis last year. "It is from that moment that the Chinese polemics degenerate into street-fighting, insults, unwarranted verbal violence. The Italian Communists were accused of parliamentary cretinism, the French of stupid servility, the Soviet Communists of degeneracy and treason." The Italian Communists, it says, "had to argue and fight,...because the Chinese Communists were attacking and denying, often without even knowing it well, a political and ideological structure which we have built up, both through our independent efforts and working in common with other parties, through long years of struggles." Four documents with self-explanatory titles follow: "Peace and Revolution"; "The XXth Congress and Stalin"; "Our Experience"; and "Against Fractionalism in the Working Movement." The last of these repeats Soviet charges that the Chinese recruit individuals to struggle against the majority in parties and mass organization, and even "try to win over to its side entire parties," "making use of the leaders of the Albanian Labor Party" for this purpose, and "supporting splinter groups everywhere: in Belgium, France, Brazil, Australia, United States, Greece, Switzerland, even Italy itself." Pravda re-publishes these materials on 8 October, and Tass distributes a summary.

In Djakarta, PKI Chairman Aidit delivers a speech on "questions facing the international Communist movement" to a meeting of 1,000 activists welcoming home the Aidit-led delegation which had just visited 5 countries in 10 weeks, spending 3 weeks in the USSR, 1 in Cuba, 1 in East Germany, 3 in China and 1 in North Korea.

A brief 1 October Antara (official Indonesian agency) account indicates that Aidit continued balancing between the Soviets and the Chinese, though his speech apparently has a noticeable Chinese accent. Aidit acknowledges that the ICM is going through a momentous process of "selection, crystallization and consolidation," in which the Indonesian Communists ought to play a bigger role. The selection is to determine who are the "genuine Marxist-Leninists" and who are the "false Marxist-Leninists or revisionists." Aidit calls this process the "ideological steeling" (tempering?) of the ICM. A longer NCNA report (to which the Chinese papers devote half a page on the 5th) has Aidit saying that the PKI "not only rejected the baton of any other CP but also will not allow any baton to be waved within the Party itself." He also expressed the PKI's hope that the CPSU-CCP bilateral meetings be continued, and that, "on a rotation basis, the place for the next talks should be Peking."

Meanwhile, the Chinese were giving royal treatment to a "delegation of the Indonesian Cooperation Parliament" led by M.H. Lukman, Deputy Speaker of the Parliament as well as First Vice Chairman of the PKI CC, which arrived in Peking on the 27th at the invitation of Chu Te, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, and, simultaneously, a delegation of Indonesian journalists led by the Secretary General of the Indonesian Journalists Association, "whospoke highly of the support given by Chinese journalists to the conference of Afro-Asian journalists." (NCNA)

In Tokyo, Akahata reports JCP CC Chairman Nosaka as affirming at a press conference on the 27th that "The JCP will not side with one party or the other in the Sino-Soviet dispute.... The dispute should be settled in accordance with the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement which represent Marxism-Leninism."

In Belgrade, Borba turns against the Chinese one aspect of their 26 September attack on Yugoslavia (see last issue of Chronology) pointing to its assertion that in 1954 China consented to regard Yugoslavia as a fraternal socialist country only on the request of Khrushchev. It follows, says Borba, that in appraising Yugoslavia's social system at that time the Chinese leadership was "guided by narrow-minded political ambitions and strategic designs" rather than the facts. Now their unscrupulous attacks on Yugoslavia as a capitalist country are also made to gain definite political ends.

September 30 - In a long speech at a Polish-East German friendship rally in Warsaw on the occasion of Ulbricht's visit, Polish chief Gomulka endorses "the recent CPSU statement" and accuses the Chinese of harming the international socialist movement by

their inadmissible polemics. Pointing to France's calm refusal to sign the test-ban treaty when her views differed from those of her allies, he asks why the Chinese could not have done the same. Ulbricht's speech on the same occasion avoids the issue.

Pravda devotes half a page to excerpts from a Paraguay CP statement in support of the CPSU's position, stating that "the wait-and-see position, the position of sitting on the fence, is objectively impossible," that "the dogmatic deviation of Mao Tse-tung has become the chief danger within the ICM," and "therefore, it would be correct to amend" the Declaration of 1960 to reflect this, "possibly by adopting an additional declaration." It goes on to warn that "political isolation of the splitters remains the only way to preserve unity." This Latin call to get off the fence was published alongside of a Tass account of a 28 September "neutral" Castro speech in which he flaunts Cuba's pose of indecision on signing the test-ban treaty, -- although Tass omitted Castro's remarks on the treaty.

But the CP Secretary Gasperoni in San Marino, world's smallest republic, at a rally of 2000 Communists accuses Khrushchev of edging too close to capitalist policies of the West and failing to give adequate attention to the achievements of the Chinese Party.

October 1 - The Communist world marked the 14th anniversary of the CPR's founding with the usual celebration in Peking, receptions by Chinese Embassies and messages from around the world. There were no Soviet or East European (other than Albanian) representatives among the "distinguished foreign guests" at the Peking demonstration, but greetings from all were reported.. The Soviet greeting and editorials in Pravda and Izvestiya emphasize the importance of selfless Soviet aid in the liberation of China and the building of the CPR, and the latter goes on to say that "the Soviet people react with bitterness and regret to the attempts of certain persons to sow mistrust and hostility toward the Soviet Union among the Chinese people." The Chinese press subsequently reported that anniversary articles attacking the CPR were printed in Pravda, Izvestiya and Krasnaya Zvezda.

On the Chinese side, Peng Chen's celebration speech, emphasizing Chinese triumphs over "natural disasters," says that "we have won a growing number of friends, contrary to the desire of the imperialists, reactionaries, modern revisionists and modern dogmatists to isolate China." The Red Flag editorial, same date, talks about "some people who call themselves Marxist-Leninists" who have been recruited as "members of the anti-China chorus under the U.S. imperialist baton.... They insist that China 'is at present in economic recession,'" and 'allegedly say that the Chinese people drink only diluted soup and have no trousers, and so forth.'" These "modern revisionists are most elated in teasing the Chinese people for being very poor; therefore they look down upon the Chinese people."

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October 1 - Tass exposes as "a deliberate forgery" a document purportedly originating with the ship-borne Third World Meeting of Journalists and distributed to Algerian and Tunisian press and foreign correspondents protesting against Czech closing of the NCNA office in Prague. And Reuters reports from Moscow on an article in Kazakhstan Pravda by "a former major general of the Chinese Communist army who fled to Russia," which described a May 1962 massacre in the Ili area of Sinkiang, when Chicom machine gunners fired into a crowd outside a CCP office who were "apparently seeking permission to leave China for Russia."

October 3 - In an appeal entitled "Toward a United Front with The Chinese," the Political Bureau of the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party of Bolivia characterizes the position of the CCP as "part of the position of the Fourth International." (Tass)

The 10-day ICCJ-sponsored, Chinese-boycotted Third World Meeting of Journalists on board the Soviet ship Litva (see also Propagandist's Guide #12) officially* ends in Beirut with a communique stressing their conviction that "the struggle for peaceful coexistence is closely linked with the movement for national liberation." *(However, the Litva took its junketing journalists on to Cyprus on the 5th and then into the Black Sea for a red carpet tour of Odessa, Yalta, Sochi, Batumi and Tbilisi.)

Radio Moscow begins broadcasting a summary of a 33-page Communist article entitled "The General Line of the World Communist Movement and the Schismatic Platform of the Chinese Leadership," which the Moscow correspondent of New York Times terms "the most sweeping condemnation yet made by Moscow," and Radio Belgrade "the sharpest criticism and denunciation yet of the Chinese leadership's wrong, harmful and dangerous activities." The text reportedly denounces a long list of ideological and political crimes of the Chinese leaders and states: "All this compels us to disclose that the pernicious theoretical platform and political line of the Chinese leadership are incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and alien in character to the general line of the international Communist movement." Reuters reports from Moscow that "the statement is seen here as laying the basis for a possible 'outlawing' of the CCP," and the New York Times correspondent writes that "Western observers felt the editorial had special significance in view of recent indications that the Soviet leaders might be intending to call an international conference of Communist parties to denounce the Chinese leadership."

October 4 - The Albanian organ Zeri i Popullit, which on the 3rd published the text of the 14 July CPSU open letter for the first time, appears in an enlarged edition with a 20,000-word reply entitled "N. Khrushchev Has Openly Unfurled the Banner of Division and Treason." It is a harsh compilation of previously expressed Albanian views, replete with personalized invective, but with a few formulations worthy of note. After describing Soviet propaganda measures to publicize their letter as a new document, a program for the entire ICM, etc., the article comes up with a highly quotable observation:

"But the fact that every two months we see a new Communist Manifesto appearing shows very clearly the real value of these documents."

Also, passages at the end of Part I attack "the N. Khrushchev group" for accusing the Chinese of racism and "Genghis Khan tendencies," of trying to exploit fear of the "yellow peril." "Such an accusation against a Marxist-Leninist party and against a socialist country is not fortuitous coming from the mouth of the N. Khrushchev group, which is deeply imbedded in the mire of great state chauvinism. ...it has in reality endeavored to establish the domination of the Tsars in the socialist camp and the ICM."

October 5 - All Peking papers give prominence to reports of reception by Mao and other top leaders of "delegations of minority nationalities" in Peking for the National Day celebration, naming Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and a half dozen other provinces,-- as though in reply to recent Soviet reports of troubles in Sinkiang.

October 6 - A plenary session of the CC of the French CP brought strong speeches by Secretary Thorez (who returned last month from a visit to the USSR) and Vice Secretary Rochet and a Resolution on the split. Rochet's anti-Chinese diatribe fills two pages of Humanité on the 8th and the Resolution is printed on the 9th. The resolution denounces the "noxious, profoundly pessimistic, dangerous, adventurous, erroneous and abusive" attitude of the Chinese leaders, rejects "the so-called general line" set forth in their 14 June letter and states the French Party's call for an international conference for the defense of the unity of Communism. On the 13th, Pravda publishes Thorez' speech, including the statement: "We shall decisively support the convocation of the forthcoming international conference, which will again confirm the principles of the policy of the Communist movement."

Moscow's central trade union organ Trud reports that "the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and Soviet trade unions have decided to give every support to the Afro-Asian Trade Union Conference." Trud insists that it is necessary to establish "a broadly representative preparatory committee" which "should comprise representatives of all national trade union centers and international trade union federations that have expressed or will express a wish to take part in the meeting." It attacks the Chinese for reviving the "problem" of whether the USSR belongs to the Asian countries and for objecting to the participation of the World Federation of Trade Unions. And Soviet Russia carried a comment on the two-week visit of a Chinese military delegation to Sweden. "Why did the saber-rattling CPR leaders send their generals to this neutral northern country situated far from their country?" The report quotes the "unofficial opinion" of the commander of the Swedish forth Military District, Major General Gustav Alerman, that the idea is to strengthen and expand military cooperation between the northern and eastern neighbors of the USSR:

"From the military point of view it is important for Sweden to have good relations with China. If the Soviet Union attacks Sweden, the Chinese could help us by grabbing the Russians by the tail."

October 7 - The Rumanian party organ Scinteia, in an article marking the beginning of Rumanian-Soviet Friendship Month leading up to the Anniversary of the "October Revolution," pays tribute to "the USSR's special role in the struggle to insure peace,... and the triumph of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence."

October 8 - An Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman says that the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in New Delhi had been summoned to the Ministry, his attention drawn to the distribution in India by the Chinese Embassy of a booklet containing the 26 September People's Daily/Red Flag article "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist State?" and requested the Embassy to cease circulating this "unbridled attack on a friendly state and the head of its government." (Reuters)

Press reports major disturbances among Ceylon leftists due to pro-Chinese elements. The English-language Ceylonese press reports that the CCP fired the editors of the Party's Sinhala and Tamil newspapers (Maubima and Desabhimani, respectively) for "toeing the pro-China line which the Party CC has categorically rejected." The dismissal followed by a week a CC Resolution denouncing the Chinese and pledging continued support to the Moscow line, and the rebels reacted with public statements criticizing the CC action as "undemocratic and unconstitutional." The Daily Mirror comments that, although the fired editors retained their membership, about a dozen of the 34 CC members are unlikely to attend the next meeting because of the discord. Meanwhile, on 5 October the Chinese Kwangming Daily carries a summary of a glowing tribute to the CCP and Mao from "the Ceylon paper Worker, organ of the Ceylon Trade Union Federation" (date not given), despite "the insults and false propaganda conducted by imperialists, reactionaries and revisionists against China."

October 8 - The Indonesian CP organ Harian Rakjat denounces a Yugoslav Borba commentary on the Malaysia issue, accusing "the Yugoslav revisionists" of trying "to save the face of U.S. imperialism," and "to prettify the ugly face of the United Nations and to save its prestige."

October 9 - Czech organ Rude Pravo, in a long criticism of the Chinese line entitled "Socialism and the National Liberation Movement," twits the Chinese on Hong Kong and Macao.

"What would the Chinese representative say if we compared, for example, the position of the 'agent of imperialism' -- as they quite unfoundedly call Indian Prime Minister Nehru -- on the liberation of the Portuguese colony of Goa on Indian territory with the Chinese Government's approach to the Portuguese colony of Macao, lying on CPR territory, or to Hong Kong?"

October 10 - The new issue of the Hungarian political and theoretical journal Tarsadalmi Szemle, in "Our Argument and the Building of Socialism," points to "the identity of situations and motives" between the Chinese leaders today and the Russian Trotskyites.

"Today there are great economic difficulties in China, as there were in the twenties in the USSR. Like the Trotskyites, the Chinese leaders do not believe in the possibility of rapidly overcoming these difficulties and they divert the energies of the working people from national problems toward struggle against U.S. imperialism and problems of world revolution."

And Peking NCNA announces that "more than 700 Chinese workers who went to Mongolia in 1960 to help in the work of construction under a Sino-Mongolian government agreement have returned to China on the expiration of their terms." (See also Chronology - September 21)

CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES

No 14

28 Septiembre - 11 Octubre
1963

28 Septiembre: "Izvestiya" publica un artículo de I. Kvaskov sobre la histeria antisoviética que están azuzando en China los líderes chinos. En Dalniy, donde "se reparan barcos soviéticos bajo el acuerdo comercial soviético-chino y donde, naturalmente, tienen que hospedarse sus tripulaciones", aparecieron letreros en las puertas de los clubes, diciendo en ruso: "No se permiten extranjeros". "Lo que está pasando en Dalniy es inaudito en las relaciones entre países socialistas".

El suplemento anual para 1963 de la "Gran Enciclopedia Soviética" lleva un artículo acabado de reeditar con respecto a China que refleja los cambios habidos en las relaciones en el año transcurrido, ya que todo lo pinta en mal estado en ella. Mientras que el año pasado la Enciclopedia atribuía las dificultades de China a los infortunios naturales solamente, ahora los atribuye a: (1) la irrealista política del "gran salto adelante" puesta en práctica desde 1958; (2) el haber China aflojado sus lazos económicos con la URSS y otros países socialistas, y (3) la negativa de China a participar en la división internacional socialista del trabajo y su insistencia en fiarse de sus propias fuerzas. El artículo también extiende bastante su breve referencia del año pasado a las "grandes minorías étnicas" en la RP china, dando especial atención al grupo lingüístico "túrquico" de las zonas adyacentes al Asia central soviética.

29 Septiembre: El diario "L'Unità" del PC italiano publica un suplemento especial de 16 páginas titulado "Nosotros y los camaradas chinos; Textos y comentarios sobre las divergencias con el Partido comunista chino". La parte introductoria repasa la historia "del ataque chino contra la línea seguida por la mayoría de los Partidos comunistas" hasta su "cumbre de acridéz" durante la crisis de Cuba el año pasado. "Es desde ese momento que las polémicas chinas se degeneran en peleas callejeras, insultos y violencia verbal injustificada. Los comunistas italianos fueron acusados de cretinismo parlamentario, los franceses de servilismo estúpido, los comunistas soviéticos de degeneración y traición". Los comunistas italianos, dice, "tuvieron que discutir y pelear ... porque los comunistas chinos estaban atacando y negando, a menudo sin conocerla bien, una estructura política e ideológica que nosotros hemos edificado, tanto con nuestro esfuerzo independiente como trabajando en común con otros partidos, a través de largos años de lucha". Luego vienen cuatro documentos con títulos que no requieren explicación: "Paz y Revolución"; "El XX Congreso y Stalin"; "Nuestra Experiencia" y "Contra el fraccionalismo en el movimiento obrero". El último de estos repite las denuncias soviéticas de que los chinos reclutan individuos para luchar contra la mayoría en los partidos y las organizaciones de masa y hasta "tratan de llevarse hacia su lado a partidos enteros", "utilizando los líderes del Partido obrero albanés" con dicho propósito y "apoyando grupos escindidos en todas partes: en Bélgica, Francia, el Brasil, Australia, los EE.UU., Grecia, Suiza y hasta la misma Italia". "Pravda" reproduce dichos artículos el 8 de octubre y Tass distribuye un resumen.

En Jakarta el presidente Aidit del PKI pronuncia un discurso sobre "cuestiones que confronta el movimiento comunista internacional" ante una asamblea de mil activistas que dan la bienvenida de regreso a la delegación encabezada por Aidit que acaba de visitar cinco países en diez semanas, pasando tres semanas en la URSS, una en Cuba, una en Alemania oriental, tres en China y una en Corea del Norte.

Una breve noticia de Antara, la agencia noticiera indonesia, el primero de octubre indica que Aidit continúa equilibrándose entre los soviéticos y los chinos, aunque su discurso parece tener un notable acento chino. Aidit reconoce que el movimiento comunista internacional está pasando por un proceso importante de "selección, cristalización y consolidación" en el cual los comunistas indonesios deberían tener un papel más importante. La selección es para decidir quiénes son los "genuinos marxistas-leninistas" y quiénes los "falsos marxistas-leninistas o revisionistas". Aidit denomina este proceso el "aceramiento [templadura?] ideológico" del movimiento comunista internacional. Un informe más extenso de la Agencia Nueva China (que ocupa media plana en los diarios chinos del día 5) dice que Aidit declaró que el PKI "no solo rechazó la batuta de cualquier otro PC sino que no permitirá que se utilice una batuta dentro del partido mismo". Expresó también la esperanza del PKI de que se continuarán las reuniones bilaterales entre el PCUS y el PC chino y de que, "a base de rotación, la sede de las siguientes conversaciones deberá ser Pekín."

Los chinos entretanto siguen tratando a cuerpo de ray a una "delegación del Parlamento indonesio de cooperación" encabezada por M.H. Lukman, vicepresidente del Parlamento así como primer vicepresidente del CC del PKI, que llegó a Pekín el 27 a invitación de Chu Te, presidente del comité permanente del Congreso nacional del pueblo, y al mismo tiempo a una delegación de periodistas indonesios encabezada por el secretario general de la Asociación de periodistas indonesios, el cual "expresó altos conceptos del apoyo prestado por los periodistas chinos a la conferencia de periodistas afroasiáticos". (Agencia Nueva China)

En Tokio, Akahata informa que el presidente Nosaka del CC del PC japonés en conferencia de prensa el 27 declaró que "el PC japonés no se va a ir de parte de un lado o del otro en la disputa chino-soviética ... La disputa deberá ser resuelta de acuerdo con las dos Declaraciones de Moscú que representan el marxismo-leninismo".

En Belgrado, "Borba" vira en contra de los chinos un aspecto del ataque de estos contra Yugoslavia el 26 de septiembre (vea la edición próximopasada de la Cronología) señalando su aserto de que en 1954 China se avino a considerar a Yugoslavia como país socialista fraterno sólo a petición de Krushev. Resulta, dice "Borba," que al estimar el sistema social de Yugoslavia en aquel entonces el liderato chino se guiaba por "ambiciones políticas de mente estrecha y designios estratégicos" y no por los hechos. Ahora sus ataques sin escrúpulo contra Yugoslavia como país capitalista los hacen para ganar precisos fines políticos.

30 Septiembre: En un extenso discurso en una manifestación de amistad polaco-germano oriental en Varsovia con motivo de la visita de Ulbricht,

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el jefe polaco Gomulka se suscribe a "la reciente declaración del PCUS" y acusa a los chinos de perjudicar el movimiento socialista internacional con sus polémicas inadmisibles. Señalando la tranquila negativa de Francia a suscribir el tratado contra los ensayos cuando sus opiniones contrastaron con las de sus aliados, se pregunta si los chinos no pudieron haber hecho otro tanto. En su discurso en la misma oportunidad Ulbricht evita la cuestión.

"Pravda" dedica media plana a extractos de una declaración del PC paraguayo en apoyo de la posición del PCUS, diciendo que "la posición de esperar a ver, la posición entre dos aguas, es objetivamente imposible", que "la desviación dogmática de Mao Tse-tung se ha convertido en el riesgo principal en el seno del movimiento comunista internacional", y "por lo tanto sería correcto enmendar" la Declaración de 1960 para reflejarlo, "posiblemente adoptando una declaración adicional". Prosigue diciendo que "el aislamiento político de los escisionistas permanece la única manera de resguardar la unidad". Este llamado latino a optar por una u otra parte fue publicado al lado de un informe de Tass sobre un discurso "neutral" de Fidel Castro el 28 de septiembre en que este alardea de la pose cubana de indecisión en cuanto a firmar el tratado contra los ensayos-- aunque Tass omitió lo que Castro dijo sobre el tratado.

Pero el secretario Gasperoni del PC de San Marino, la república más diminuta del mundo, en una manifestación de dos mil comunistas acusa a Krushev de aproximarse demasiado a las políticas capitalistas de Occidente y de no prestar apropiada atención a las realizaciones del Partido chino.

1º Octubre: El mundo comunista observó el 14º aniversario de la fundación de la RP china con la acostumbrada celebración en Pekín, recepciones en las embajadas chinas y mensajes de todo el mundo. Entre los "distinguidos invitados extranjeros" en la manifestación en Pekín no hubo representantes soviéticos ni europeos orientales (excepto albaneses), pero se dieron a conocer las felicitaciones de todos ellos. El saludo soviético y editoriales en "Pravda" e "Izvestiya" ponen énfasis en la importancia de la desinteresada ayuda soviética en la liberación de China y la construcción de la RP china, y éste último continúa diciendo que "el pueblo soviético reacciona con amargura y pesar ante las tentativas de ciertas personas de sembrar la desconfianza y la hostilidad hacia la Unión Soviética entre el pueblo chino". La prensa china luego informó que "Pravda", "Izvestiya" y "Krasnaya Zvezda" habían publicado artículos de ataque contra la RP china en su aniversario.

Del lado chino, el discurso de celebración de Peng Chen, poniendo de relieve los triunfos chinos contra los "desastres naturales", declara que "hemos conquistado un número creciente de amigos pese a los deseos de los imperialistas, los reaccionarios, los revisionistas contemporáneos y los dogmáticos contemporáneos de aislar a China". El editorial de "Bandera Roja" de la misma fecha se refiere a "ciertas personas que se autodenominan marxistas-leninistas" y que han sido reclutadas como "miembros del coro antichino bajo la batuda imperialista de los EE.UU... Insisten en que China 'está actualmente en receso económico', y 'se dice que declaran que el pueblo chino toma solamente sopa aguada y carece de pantalones, y cosas por el estilo'".

Estos "revisionistas contemporáneos se dan el mayor gusto vejando al pueblo por ser muy pobre, y por eso miran con desprecio al pueblo chino".

1º Octubre: Tass denuncia como "falsificación intencional" un "documento" que se dice haber tenido origen en el Tercer encuentro mundial de periodistas llevado a cabo a bordo de un barco y que fue distribuido a la prensa de Túnez y Argelia y a los corresponsales extranjeros, en el cual se protesta contra la clausura de la oficina de Praga de la Agencia Nueva China. Y Reuters informa desde Moscú un artículo en el "Kazakhstan Pravda" escrito por un "ex general del Ejército comunista chino que se evadió a Rusia", describiendo una matanza de mayo de 1962 en la zona de Ili en Sinkiang, en que chinos comunistas armados de ametralladoras dispararon contra una multitud frente a una oficina del PC chino que "aparentemente estaban pidiendo permiso para irse de China a Rusia".

3 Octubre: En un llamamiento bajo el título "Hacia un frente unido con los chinos", el buró político del Partido obrero revolucionario tratskista de Bolivia representa la posición del PC chino como "parte de la posición de la Cuarta Internacional". (Tass)

El Tercer encuentro mundial de periodistas, llevado a cabo durante diez días a bordo del vapor soviético Litva bajo los auspicios de la CICP y boicoteado por los chinos (véase la Guía del Propagandista No. 12) termina oficialmente¹⁾ en Beirut con un comunicado recalcando su convicción de que "la lucha por la coexistencia pacífica está estrechamente vinculada al movimiento por la liberación nacional."
¹⁾ (No obstante, el Litva siguió con sus paseadores periodistas hasta Chipre el 5 y luego al Mar Negro en gira honorífica de Odesa, Yalta, Sochi, Batumi y Tbilisi.)

La Radio de Moscú comienza a difundir un resumen de 38 páginas de un artículo en "Kommunist" titulado "La línea general del movimiento comunista mundial y la plataforma cismática del liderato chino", descrito por el corresponsal en Moscú del "New York Times" como "la reprobación más amplia hecha hasta hoy por Moscú", y por la Radio de Belgrado como "la más aguda crítica y denuncia hasta hoy de las actividades equivocadas, perjudiciales y peligrosas del liderato chino". El texto según se dice condena un gran número de delitos ideológicos y políticos de los líderes chinos y declara: "Todo esto nos obliga a dar a conocer que la perniciosa plataforma teórica y línea política del liderato chino son incompatibles con el marxismo-leninismo y de carácter ajeno a la línea general del movimiento comunista internacional". Informa Reuters desde Moscú que "aquí se estima que la declaración echa las bases para una posible 'proscripción' del PC chino", y el corresponsal del "New York Times" escribe que "los observadores occidentales creyeron que el editorial tenía especial significación en vista de indicios recientes de que los líderes soviéticos posiblemente tuvieran intención de convocar a una conferencia internacional de Partidos comunistas para condenar al liderato chino".

4 Octubre: El órgano albanés "Zeri I Popullit", que el día 3 por vez primera dio a la luz el texto de la carta abierta del PCUS de 14 de julio, aparece en edición ampliada con una contestación de 20 mil palabras titulada "N. Krushev abiertamente ha desplegado la bandera

de la división y la traición". Es una ruda recopilación de opiniones albanesas expresadas anteriormente, repleta de insultos personales pero con unas cuantas formulaciones dignas de tomar en cuenta. Luego de describir las medidas de propaganda soviéticas por dar publicidad a la carta como un documento nuevo, un programa para todo el movimiento comunista internacional, etc., el artículo ofrece un comentario muy digno de citarse:

"Pero el hecho de que cada dos meses vemos aparecer un nuevo Manifiesto Comunista indica muy a las claras el verdadero valor de dichos documentos".

Además, trozos del final de la Primera Parte atacan al "grupo de N. Krushev" por acusar a los chinos de racismo y "tendencias de Genghis Khan" y de tratar de explotar el temor al "peligro amarillo". "Semejante acusación contra un partido marxista-leninista y contra un país socialista no es fortuita viniendo de boca del grupo de N. Krushev, que está profundamente sumergido en el lodo del chovinismo de gran potencia.... realmente ha pretendido imponer el dominio de los Zares en el campo socialista y el movimiento comunista internacional".

5 Octubre: Todos los diarios de Pekín destacan informaciones sobre el recibimiento por parte de Mao y otros líderes del más alto nivel de "delegaciones de nacionalidades de minoría" en Pekín que asisten a la celebración del Día Nacional, y hace mención de Sinkiang, Mongolia Interior, Tibet y otra media docena de provincias -- como en respuesta a los recientes informes soviéticos sobre malestares en Sinkiang.

6 Octubre: Una reunión plenaria del CC del PC francés produjo vigorosos discursos del secretario Thorez (que el mes pasado regresó de la URSS) y el vicesecretario Rochet y una Resolución sobre la escisión. La diatriba de Rochet contra los chinos ocupa dos planas del diario "L'Humanité" del día 8 y la resolución sale el día 9. La resolución condena la actitud "nociva, profundamente pesimista, peligrosa, aventurada, errónea y abusiva" de los líderes chinos, rechaza la "llamada línea general" expuesta en su carta de 14 de junio y expone el llamamiento del Partido francés a una conferencia internacional en defensa de la unidad del comunismo. "Pravda" el día 13 publica el discurso de Thorez, incluyendo el aserto: "Decisivamente apoyaremos la convocatoria de la venidera conferencia internacional que de nuevo habrá de confirmar los principios de la política del movimiento comunista".

"Trud", órgano central sindical de Moscú, informa que "el Comité soviético de solidaridad afroasiática y los sindicatos soviéticos han resuelto prestar completo apoyo a la Conferencia afroasiática de sindicatos". "Trud" insiste en que es preciso establecer "un comité preparatorio ampliamente representativo" que "debería comprender representantes de todas las centrales sindicales nacionales y federaciones sindicales internacionales que han expresado o expresen el deseo de tomar parte en la reunión". Ataca a los chinos por resucitar el "problema" de si la URSS pertenece entre los países asiáticos y por oponerse a la participación de la Federación Sindical Mundial. Y "Rusia Soviética" publicó un comentario sobre la visita a Suecia de una delegación militar china que se prolongó por dos semanas. "Por

qué los líderes de desplantes belicosos de la RP china enviaron sus generales a este país neutral situado a gran distancia de su país?" El informe cita la "opinión extraoficial" del mayor general Gustav Akerman, comandante del Cuarto Distrito Militar sueco, de que el propósito es fortalecer y extender la cooperación militar entre los vecinos al norte y al este de la URSS:

"Desde el punto de vista militar es importante para Suecia tener buenas relaciones con China. Si la Unión Soviética ataca a Suecia los chinos podrían ayudarnos agarrando a los rusos por la cola".

7 Octubre: "Scinteia", el órgano del partido rumano, en un artículo que inicia el Mes de la amistad rumano-soviética que ha de llevar al Aniversario de la "Revolución de Octubre", rinde tributo al "papel especial de la URSS en la lucha por asegurar la paz ... y el triunfo de los principios leninistas de la coexistencia pacífica".

8 Octubre: Un portavoz del ministerio indio de Asuntos Exteriores declara que el agregado chino en Nueva Delhi había sido citado al ministerio, donde se le había llamado la atención a la distribución en India por la Embajada china de un folleto conteniendo el artículo publicado el 26 de septiembre en el "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" titulado "¿Es Yugoslavia un estado socialista?" y se le había solicitado a la Embajada no hacer circular dicho "ataque de senfrenado contra un estado amigo y el jefe de su gobierno". (Reuters)

La prensa informa disturbios de mayor cuantía entre izquierdistas ceilaneses debido a elementos prochinos. La prensa de Ceilán en lengua inglesa informa que el PC ceilánés había despedido a los editores de sus diarios en lengua cingalesa ("Maubima") y tamil ("Desabhimani") por "adherirse a la línea prochina que el CC del Partido ha rechazado categóricamente". El despedido ocurrió una semana después de una resolución del CC en que se denunciaba a los chinos y se prometía apoyo constante a la línea de Moscú, y los rebeldes reaccionaron con declaraciones públicas criticando la acción del CC como "antidemocrática y anticonstitucional". El "Daily Mirror" comenta que, aunque los editores despedidos permanecieron como miembros, como una docena de los 34 miembros del CC probablemente no asistan a la próxima reunión debido a la discordia. Entretanto el "Diario de Kwangming" chino publica un resumen de un tributo esplendoroso al PC chino y a Mao del "diario ceilánés "Worker", órgano de la Federación sindical ceilanesa" (en fecha no indicada), a pesar de "los insultos y la falsa propaganda conducida por los imperialistas, reaccionarios y revisionistas contra China".

8 Octubre: El órgano "Harian Rakjat" del PC indonesio condena un comentario del "Borba" yugoslavo sobre la cuestión de Malaisia, acusando a los "revisionistas yugoslavos" de tratar de "evitarle bochorno al imperialismo norteamericano" y "embellecer el feo rostro de la UNO y salvar su prestigio".

9 Octubre: El órgano checo "Rude Pravo", criticando la línea china en un extenso artículo titulado "El socialismo y el movimiento de liberación nacional", le toma el pelo a los chinos con respecto a Hong Kong y Macao:

"¿Que dirían los representantes chinos si nosotros comparáramos, por ejemplo, la posición del 'agente del imperialismo' -- como ellos sin ningún fundamento llaman a Nehru, Primer Ministro indio -- sobre la liberación de la colonia portuguesa de Goa en territorio indio, con la actitud del gobierno chino hacia la colonia portuguesa de Macao, que yace en territorio chino, o hacia Hong Kong?"

9 Octubre: La nueva edición del órgano político y teórico húngaro "Társadalmi Szemle", en el artículo "Nuestro argumento y la construcción del socialismo", señala "la identidad de situaciones y móviles" entre los líderes chinos de hoy y los trotskistas rusos.

"Hoy día hay grandes dificultades económicas en China, como las hubo en la década del 20 en la URSS. Como los trotskistas, los líderes chinos no creen en la posibilidad de sobreponerse rápidamente a dichas dificultades y así apartan las energías del pueblo trabajador de los problemas nacionales y hacia la lucha contra el imperialismo norteamericano y los problemas de la revolución mundial".

Y la Agencia Nueva China en Pekín anuncia que "más de 700 trabajadores chinos que fueron a Mongolia en 1960 a ayudar en la obra de construcción bajo un acuerdo entre los gobiernos chinos y mongol han regresado a China al vencerse su tiempo". (Véase además la Cronología - 21 de septiembre.)

CRONOLIGIE -- DISSENTIONS COMMUNISTES

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28 septembre: Izvestiya publie un article de I. Kvaskov concernant les sentiments hystériques anti-soviétiques soulevés en Chine par les leaders chinois. A Dalniy, où "les navires soviétiques se trouvent en réparation aux termes de l'accord commercial sino-soviétique, et où naturellement leurs équipages doivent séjourner", des pancartes sont apparues sur les portes des clubs qui spécifient en langue russe: "Interdit aux étrangers". "Ce qui se passe à Dalniy ne s'est jamais vu dans les relations entre pays socialistes".

Le supplément annuel de 1963 à La grande encyclopédie soviétique contient un article nouvellement écrit au sujet de la Chine, qui reflète les changements survenus au cours de l'année dernière dans les relations entre les deux pays et déclare que tout va mal en Chine. Alors que l'encyclopédie de l'année dernière attribuait les difficultés de la Chine à des calamités naturelles exclusivement, à l'heure actuelle ces difficultés sont dues a" 1^o - la politique sans réalisme du "grand bond en avant" pratiqués depuis 1958; 2^o - l'abandon par la Chine des liens économiques avec l'Union soviétique et d'autres pays socialistes; et, 3^o - le refus de la Chine de participer à la division socialiste internationale du travail et à son insistance de ne dépendre que sur ses propres forces. L'article d'autre part s'étend largement sur le traitement réservé l'année dernière à de "grandes minorités ethniques" en République populaire chinoise, avec une attention spéciale aux groupe de langue turque dans les régions avoisinantes de l'Asie centrale soviétique.

29 septembre: L'Unita, quotidien du parti communiste italien, donne un supplément spécial de 16 pages sous le titre "Nous et les camarades chinois, texte et commentaires sur les divergences avec le parti communiste chinois". L'introduction donne l'historique de "l'attaque chinoise dirigée contre la ligne poursuivie par la majorité des partis communistes". Jusqu'à son "maximum de violence" atteint lors de la crise cubaine de l'année dernière. "C'est à partir de ce moment que la polémique chinoise a dégénéré en une bataille de rue, en des insultes, et en des violences oratoires injustifiées. Le parti communiste italien fut accusé de crétinisme parlementaire, le parti français de servilité stupide, les communistes soviétiques de dégénérescence et de trahison". Les communistes italiens, déclare-t-il "devaient protester et se battre ... car les communistes chinois attaquaient et réfutaient, souvent sans bien la connaître, la structure politique et idéologique que nous avons érigés, aussi bien grâce à nos efforts indépendants qu'au travail en commun avec d'autres partis, au travers de longues années de lutte". Quatre documents portant des titres qui s'expliquent d'eux-mêmes suivaient: "Paix et révolution"; "Le 20^e congrès et Staline"; "Notre expérience"; et "Contre le fractionnalisme dans le mouvement ouvrier". Le dernier de ces articles reprend les accusations soviétiques selon lesquelles les Chinois recrutent des individus pour lutter contre la majorité dans les partis et les organisations de masse, et que même "il cherchent à attirer de leur côté des partis tout entiers", "utilisant les leaders du parti travailliste albanais" à cet effet, et "soutenant des grou-

pements dissidents partout: en Belgique, en France, au Brésil, en Australie, aux Etats-Unis, en Grèce, en Suisse et même en Italie". Pravda publie de nouveau ces documents le 8 octobre, et TASS en distribue un résumé.

A Djakarta, Aidit, président du parti communiste indonésien, fait un discours sur "la question qui se pose au mouvement communiste international" au cours d'une réunion de 1 000 activistes saluant le retour de la délégation dirigée par Aidit qui venait de visiter 5 pays en dix semaines, et ayant passé trois semaines en Union soviétique, une au Cuba, une en Allemagne de l'Est, trois en Chine et une en Corée du Nord.

Un bref communiqué date du 1^{er} octobre par Antara (agence officielle indonésienne) montre que Aidit continue à vaciller entre les Soviétiques et les Chinois, bien que son discours laisse apparaître un accent pro-chinois. Aidit reconnaît que le mouvement communiste international est en train de passer par une période importante de "sélection, cristallisation et consolidation", au cours de laquelle les communistes indonésiens devraient jouer un rôle plus important. La sélection consiste à déterminer qui représente "les marxistes-léninistes véritables" et qui sont "les faux marxistes-léninistes ou révisionnistes". Aidit qualifie ce processus de "trempe idéologique" du mouvement communiste international. Un communiqué plus long de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle (auquel les journaux chinois consacrent une demi-page le 5 de ce mois) fait déclarer à Aidit que le parti communiste indonésien "a non seulement rejeté le baton de tout autre parti communiste mais qu'il ne permettrait pas qu'il y ait le baton brandi au sein du parti lui-même". Il exprime également l'espoir du parti communiste indonésien que les réunions bilatérales des partis communistes soviétique et chinois continueront, et que "le principe de la rotation veut que le lieu des prochains entretiens soit Pékin.

Entretiens, les Chinois font un accueil royal "à la délégation du Parlement de la coopération indonésienne" ayant à sa tête M.H. Lukman, vice-président du Parlement et premier vice-président du Comité central du parti communiste indonésien. Cette délégation est arrivée à Pékin le 27 invitée par Chu Te, président du Comité permanent du NPC, en même temps qu'une délégation de journalistes indonésiens dirigée par le secrétaire général de l'Association des journalistes indonésiens, "qui loua hautement le soutien accordé aux journalistes chinois à la conférence des journalistes afro-asiatiques". (Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle)

A Tokyo, Akahata fait savoir que Nosaka, président du Comité central du parti communiste japonais, aurait affirmé à une conférence de presse tenue le 27 que "le parti communiste japonais ne se rangera ni d'un côté ni de l'autre dans la querelle sino-soviétique ... Cette querelle devrait être réglée en accord avec les déclarations de Moscou qui représente le marxisme-léninisme".

A Belgrade, Borba retourne contre les Chinois un des aspects de leur attaque du 26 septembre contre la Yougoslavie (voir dernier numéro de la Chronologie), soulignant son affirmation qu'en 1954 la Chine ne consentait à considérer la Yougoslavie en tant que pays socialiste fraternel qu'à la requête de Khrouchtchev. Il s'en suit

déclare Borba, qu'en évaluant le système social yougoslave à cette époque le leader chinois était "guidé par des ambitions politiques étroites et par des desseins stratégiques" plutôt que par des faits. Aujourd'hui, leurs attaques sans scrupules contre la Yougoslavie prétendant que celle-ci est un pays capitaliste ont également pour but de parvenir à des fins politiques bien définies.

30 septembre: Dans un long discours au cours d'une réunion de l'amitié entre la Pologne et l'Allemagne de l'Est, tenue à Varsovie à l'occasion de la visite d'Ulbricht, le chef polonais Gomulka approuve "la récente déclaration du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique", et accuse les Chinois de faire du tort au mouvement socialiste international par leurs polémiques inadmissibles. Soulignant que la France a refusé calmement de signer le traité interdisant les expériences nucléaires, car ses vues étaient opposées à celles de ses alliés, il demande si les Chinois n'auraient pu en faire autant. Au cours de son discours en la même occasion, Ulbricht évita d'effleurer cette question.

Pravda consacre une demie-page de citations tirées de la déclaration du parti communiste du Paraguay soutenant la position du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, et déclarant que "la position d'attente, la position de se trouver à cheval sur une barrière, est objectivement impossible", que "la déviation dogmatique de Mao Tse-tung est devenue le danger principal qui menace le mouvement communiste international", et "par conséquent il serait correct de modifier" la déclaration de 1960 afin qu'elle réfléchisse ce fait, "en adoptant peut-être une déclaration supplémentaire". Cette déclaration poursuit pour dire que "l'isolement politique des séparatistes constitue le seul moyen pour préserver l'unité". Cet appel de l'Amérique Latine de décembre de la barrière a été publié à côté d'un communiqué du TASS daté du 28 septembre concernant le discours "neutre" de Castro où celui-ci étale la position d'indécision cubaine à l'égard de la signature du traité interdisant les essais nucléaires; TASS cependant omit de publier les remarques de Castro au sujet de ce traité.

De son côté, Gasperoni, secrétaire du parti communiste de San Marino, la plus petite république au monde, au cours d'un rassemblement de 2 000 communistes, accuse Khrouchtchev de serrer de trop près la politique capitaliste occidentale, et de ne pas attribuer aux exploits du parti chinois l'attention qu'il mérite.

1er octobre: Le monde communiste célèbre le 14^e anniversaire de la fondation de la République populaire chinoise, par les fêtes habituelles à Pékin, les réceptions dans les ambassades chinoises et les messages parvenant de divers coins du monde. Il n'y a pas de représentants soviétiques ou européens de l'Est (autres que ceux de l'Albanie) parmi les "personnalités étrangères invitées" à la démonstration de Pékin. On annonça cependant que tous envoyèrent des félicitations. Les félicitations soviétiques et les éditoriaux de Pravda et d'Izvestiya soulignent l'importance qu'a jouée l'aide altruiste soviétique dans la libération de la Chine et la création de la République populaire chinoise, et Izvestiya va jusqu'à dire que "le peuple soviétique réagit avec amertume et regret aux tentatives de certaines personnes de semer la méfiance et l'hostilité à l'égard de l'Union soviétique parmi le peuple chinois". La presse chinoise fit savoir plus tard que des

paru dans Pravda, Izvestiya et Krasnaya Zvezda.

Du côté chinois, le discours anniversaire de Peng Chen souligne les triomphes obtenus par les Chinois sur "les désastres naturels" et déclare que "nous avons obtenu des amis en nombre croissant malgré les espoirs des impérialistes, des réactionnaires, des révisionnistes modernes et des dogmatistes modernes cherchant à isoler la Chine". Le Drapeau rouge dans son éditorial de la même date parle de "certaines personnes qui se nomment marxistes-léninistes" mais qui ont été recrutées en tant que "membres du chœur anti-Chinois sous le baton impérialiste des Etats-Unis ... Ils insistent qu'à l'heure actuelle la Chine se trouve en état de récession économique "et déclarent que, paraît-il, les Chinois ne se nourrissent que de soupe diluée, n'ont pas de culottes à se mettre, etc..." Ces "révisionnistes modernes" sont très heureux de se moquer de la pauvreté du peuple chinois; et considèrent par conséquent le peuple chinois du haut de leur grandeur".

1er octobre: Le TASS qualifie de "falsification intentionnelle" un "document" provenant, paraît-il, du bateau sur lequel s'est tenue la 3^e conférence mondiale des journalistes, et distribuait à la presse algérienne et tunisienne ainsi qu'aux correspondants étrangers et protestant contre la fermeture par les Tchèques du Bureau de l'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle à Prague. Reuters commente de Moscou sur un article paru dans Kazakhstan Pravda de la plume "d'un ancien général-major de l'armée communiste chinoise qui chercha refuge en Union soviétique", et qui dépeint le massacre qui eut lieu en mai 1962 dans la région d'Ili, du Sinkiang, massacre au cours duquel les mitrailleurs des communistes chinois tirèrent sur la foule près du bureau du parti communiste chinois "où, semble-t-il, ils cherchaient à obtenir la permission de quitter la Chine pour se rendre en Union soviétique".

3 octobre: Dans un appel intitulé "Vers un front uni avec les Chinois", le Bureau politique du parti travailliste révolutionnaire trotskiste de Bolivie dépeint la position du parti communiste chinois comme "faissant partie de la position de la 4^e Internationale". (TASS)

La 3^e Réunion mondiale de 10 jours des journalistes que boycottèrent les Chinois, organisée à bord du navire soviétique Litva (voir également Guide propagandiste Numéro 12) se termine officiellement¹⁾ à Beirut par un communiqué qui souligne la conviction que "la lutte pour la coexistence pacifique est liée étroitement avec le mouvement de libération nationale".

1) (Cependant, le Litva amena les journalistes à Chypre le 5, et de là en Mer noire pour une tournée d'Odessa, de Yalta, de Sochi, de Batumi et de Tbilisi).

Radio-Moscou commence la diffusion d'un résumé de l'article de 38 pages paru dans Kommunist, intitulé "La ligne générale du mouvement communiste mondial et la plateforme schématique des leaders chinois", article que le correspondant de New York Times à Moscou qualifie de "condamnation la plus radicale que Moscou ait jamais faite", et que Radio-Belgrade qualifie de "critique et dénonciation des plus acerbes des torts commis par les leaders chinois et de leurs activités nuisibles et dangereuses". Le texte, paraît-il, expose une longue liste de crimes idéologiques et politiques commis par les leaders chinois, et résume les efforts à réaliser que la

plateforme théorique et la ligne politique nuisibles des leaders chinois est incompatible avec le marxisme-léninisme et étrangère de caractère à la ligne générale du mouvement communiste international". Reuters rapporte de Moscou que "cette déclaration est considérée ici comme la base à une mise possible hors-la-loi du parti communiste chinois", et le correspondant du New York Times écrit que "les observateurs occidentaux estiment que cet éditorial possède une signification spéciale en raison d'indications récentes qui veulent que les leaders soviétiques aient l'intention de convoquer une conférence internationale des partis communistes dans le but d'exposer les leaders chinois".

4 octobre: L'organe albanais Zeri i Popullit, qui le 3 publiait pour la première fois le texte de la lettre ouverte du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique datée du 14 juillet, publie une édition augmentée contenant une réponse de 20 000 mots intitulée "N. Khrouchtchev a déployé ouvertement la bannière de la division et de la trahison". C'est une revue brutale des opinions exprimées précédemment par les Albanais, pleine d'invectives personnelles, mais ne contenant que peu d'idées qui méritent qu'on s'y arrête. Après avoir décrit les mesures auxquelles la propagande soviétique eut recours pour faire croire que leur lettre constituait un document nouveau, un programme pour le mouvement communiste international tout entier, etc.... l'article en arrive à l'observation très citable suivante:

"Mais le fait que tous les deux mois nous voyons apparaître un nouveau manifeste communiste souligne clairement la valeur réelle de ces documents".

Des passages à la fin de la première partie attaquent également "le groupe de N. Khrouchtchev" pour avoir accusé les Chinois de racisme, et de posséder des "tendances de Ganghis Khan", ainsi que d'essayer d'exploiter la peur du "péril jaune". "Des accusations pareilles contre un parti marxiste-léniniste et contre un pays socialiste ne sortent pas par hasard de la bouche du groupe de N. Khrouchtchev, groupe profondément enlisé dans la boue du chauvinisme de grand Etat ... En réalité, il a cherché à établir la domination des tsars dans le camp socialiste et dans le mouvement communiste international".

5 octobre: Tous les journaux de Pékin mettent en relief la réception donnée par Mao aux principaux leaders "des délégations des minorités" à Pékin lors de la célébration de la journée nationale, mentionnant Sinkiang, la Mongolie intérieure, le Thibet et une demi-douzaine d'autres provinces, comme si cela constituait une réponse aux annonces faites récemment par les Soviets concernant les désordres qui se produisaient au Sinkiang.

6 octobre: Au cours de la session plénière du Comité central du parti communiste français, des discours furent prononcés par le secrétaire Thorez (qui le mois dernier est revenu d'une visite en Union soviétique) et du secrétaire adjoint Rochet, et une résolution fut prise concernant la scission. La diatribe anti-chinoise de Rochet remplit deux pages de l'Humanité le 8, et la résolution paraît dans l'édition du 9. La résolution expose "l'attitude nuisible, profondément pessimiste, dangereuse, aventureuse, erronée et abusive" des leaders chinois, et rejette "la soi-disant ligne générale" donnée dans leur lettre du 14 juin, et déclare que le parti français demande une conférence

internationale pour la défense de l'unité du communisme. Le 13, Pravda publiait le discours de Thorez, dont la déclaration: "Nous soutiendrons décisivement la convocation de la conférence internationale projetée, qui confirmera de nouveau les principes et la politique du mouvement communiste".

A Moscou, Trud, organe central syndicaliste, fait savoir que "le Comité de la solidarité entre les Soviets et les afro-asiatiques et les syndicats professionnels soviétiques ont décidé d'accorder tout leur soutien à la conférence syndicaliste afro-asiatique". Trud insiste qu'il est nécessaire d'établir "un comité préparatoire largement représentatif" qui "comprendrait les représentants de tous les centres syndicalistes nationaux et toutes les fédérations syndicalistes internationales qui ont exprimé ou exprimeraient le désir de prendre part à cette réunion." Il attaque les Chinois pour avoir ranimé le "problème" de savoir si oui ou non l'Union soviétique faisait partie des pays asiatiques et pour avoir objecté à la participation de la fédération syndicale mondiale. Le journal Russie soviétique publie un commentaire sur la visite d'une délégation militaire chinoise en Suède qui dura deux semaines. "Pourquoi donc les leaders belliqueux de la République populaire chinoise envoient-ils leurs généraux dans ce pays nordique neutre situé aussi loin de leur pays?" L'article cite une "opinion officieuse" du commandant du 4^e District militaire suédois, le major général Gustav Akerman, selon lequel l'idée est de renforcer et d'étendre la collaboration militaire entre les voisins du nord et de l'est de l'Union soviétique:

"Du point de vue militaire, il est important que la Suède ait de bonnes relations avec la Chine. Si l'Union soviétique attaquait la Suède, les Chinois pourraient nous aider en attrapant les Russes par la queue".

7 octobre: Scinteia, organe du parti roumain, marque dans son article le début du mois de l'amitié soviéto-roumaine qui aboutira à l'anniversaire "de la révolution d'octobre", et salue "le rôle spécial de l'Union soviétique dans la lutte pour assurer la paix ... et le triomphe des principes léninistes sur la coexistence pacifique".

8 octobre: Un porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères de l'Inde déclare que le chargé d'affaires chinois à New Delhi a été convoqué au ministère, et que son attention a été attirée sur la distribution en Inde par l'ambassade chinoise d'un pamphlet contenant l'article du 26 septembre publié dans le Quotidien du peuple et le Drapeau rouge: "La Yougoslavie est-elle un Etat socialiste?" Le ministère a demandé à l'ambassade de cesser de faire circuler cette "attaque déchaînée contre un pays ami et contre le chef de son gouvernement. (Reuters)

La presse annonce des désordres sérieux parmi les membres de la gauche au Ceylan, dus aux éléments pro-chinois. La presse cingalaise de langue anglaise fait savoir que la parti communiste cingalais a limogé les éditeurs des journaux du parti singalais et tamiles (Maubima et Desabhimani, respectivement) pour avoir "suivi la ligne pro-chinoise que le parti communiste cingalais a catégoriquement rejetée". Le limogeage a suivi d'une semaine la résolution du comité central exposant les Chinois et s'engageant à continuer de soutenir

la ligne de Moscou. Les rebelles réagirent par des déclarations publiques qualifiant l'action du comité central "d'anti-démocratique et anti-constitutionnelle". Le Daily Mirror déclare que bien que les éditeurs limogés soient restés dans la parti, une douzaine environ des 34 membres du comité central semblent ne pas devoir participer à la réunion suivante en raison du désaccord. Cependant, le 5 octobre, le Quoditien de Qwangming, journal chinois, donne le résumé d'un hommage retentissant du parti communiste cingalais à Mao, publié "dans le journal cingalais Le travailleur, organe de la Fédération syndicale cingalaise" (date non communiquée) malgré "les insultes et la fausse propagande émanant des impérialistes, des réactionnaires et des révisionnistes contre la Chine".

8 octobre: Harian Rakjat, organe du parti communiste indonésien, expose un commentaire du journal yougoslave Borba sur la question de la Malaisie, accusant "les révisionnistes yougoslaves de chercher à sauver la face de l'impérialisme des Etats-Unis" et "d'embellir la face hideuse des Nations unies et de sauver son prestige".

9 octobre: Rude Pravo, organe tchèque dans une longue critique de la ligne chinoise, intitulée "Socialisme et mouvement de libération nationale" rallie les Chinois au sujet de Hong Kong et de Macao.

"Que dirait le représentant chinois si nous comparions par exemple la position de 'l'agent de l'impérialisme' -- comme ils appellent sans aucun fondement le premier ministre indien Nehru -- concernant la libération de la colonie portugaise de Goa en territoire indien avec celle du gouvernement chinois au sujet de la colonie portugaise de Macao, qui se trouve en territoire de la République populaire chinoise, ou au sujet de Hong Kong?"

10 octobre: Le dernier numéro de Tarsadalmi Szemle, journal politique et théorique hongrois, publie un article "Notre débat et la construction du socialisme", dans lequel il souligne "l'identité des situations et des motifs" entre les leaders chinois d'aujourd'hui et les trotskyistes soviétiques".

"Il existe aujourd'hui de grandes difficultés économiques en Chine comme elles existaient en Union soviétique au cours des années 20. Comme les trotskistes, les leaders chinois ne croient pas en la possibilité de surmonter rapidement ces difficultés et ils détournent les énergies des travailleurs des problèmes nationaux vers une lutte contre l'impérialisme américain et les problèmes de la révolution mondiale".

L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle annonce à Pékin que "plus de 700 travailleurs chinois qui se rendirent en Mongolie en 1960 pour aider aux travaux de construction, aux termes d'un accord gouvernemental sino-mongol, sont retournés en Chine à l'expiration de leur engagement". (Voir également Chronologie, 21 septembre).

21 October 1963

705. Communist Propaganda Techniques Turned Against Communists

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BACKGROUND: One interesting result of the current Sino-Soviet controversy is the use by each side against the other of propaganda techniques customarily used by Communists against non-Communists. It is natural, of course, for a combatant to use the weapons he is accustomed to use. And we need not feel much sympathy for either side when we see them become targets for the methods they have usually used against others. Obviously, this situation gives non-Communist propagandists an opportunity to call attention to the character of Communist propaganda output. In particular, current Sino-Soviet polemics make possible a sort of laboratory dissection of Communist propaganda technique, which we can isolate from the issues involved because these issues do not directly involve us. As with other dissections, the results are instructive, if somewhat unappetizing. (See unclassified attachment for full discussion of Communist propaganda tactics in the Sino-Soviet conflict, "Communist Propaganda Techniques Turned Against Communists.")

There is also another aspect to the Moscow-Peking propaganda battle, the progressive aggravation of relations as the two sides react against each other. These below-the-belt tactics are not easy to forgive and to forget. As recent discussion over the test ban treaty showed, the Soviets have created a reservoir of ill-will for themselves in the United States and Europe, and this makes many west Europeans and Americans hesitate to approve any agreement with Moscow, even when the agreement contains no risks and offers important gains. The same suspicion is developing between Moscow and Peking. Moreover, while western suspicion is tempered by a widespread desire to live and let live, to drop the cold war and return to domestic and private interests, a Communist is a dedicated activist and he knows that other Communists are professional revolutionaries too. Restraint does not come easily to him. While he can sometimes be coldly realistic, the Communist also has an emotional faith, and he hates those who challenge it. While a Moscow-Peking truce might be conceivable, the two sides have said and done unforgivable things to each other, and a relation of trust--if it ever existed--cannot now be restored.

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25X1C1006. Communist Agriculture -- a Proven Failure

~~Background of Communist agricultural~~

BACKGROUND: Recent Soviet grain purchases from Australia and Canada (See Briefly Noted in BPG #125 and Guidance #701 in BPG #126) have shown that the Soviet Union is currently undergoing an agricultural crisis. TASS has stated that Soviet domestic grain production this year would be 18% below the 1962 figure, and according to the New York Times (8 October 1963) grain-trading circles in New York estimate that the drop may have been up to 25%. A Soviet official has said that production in Kazakhstan this year was less than four bushels of wheat per acre; the Soviets last year claimed about 10 bushels per acre, and US production averages 15 to 20 bushels per acre. A story in Sovetskaya Rossiya (6 September 1963) gave a description of the transformation of fertile areas in East Siberia into a dust bowl (see Attachment). But what does not clearly emerge from Soviet admissions of production drops, or even from their descriptions of dust bowl conditions, is that throughout the world, Communist leadership has been a blight on agricultural production.

If we accept Soviet figures, 1962 net agricultural output exceeded -- by less than 1% -- 1958 output; meanwhile the Soviet population increased by 7%. But official Soviet grain production figures are always open to question, and experts believe in particular that Soviet figures for 1962 were falsified upward to conceal the continuation of a decline which began after the record harvest of 1958. Such a concealment may have been motivated by concern over the 1962 riots in Novocherkassk and elsewhere. Reserves have been gradually exhausted over the last five years (some experts believe the official figures are false throughout this five-year period), and when the harvest this year was worse than ever, Soviet leaders had no choice but to use some of the precious stock of Soviet gold to purchase grain on the world market.

While domestic statistics can be falsified, it is impossible to conceal purchases on the world market. With the prospective purchase of \$250 million worth of grain (4 million metric tons) from the United States, Soviet total grain purchases this year will reach the neighborhood of 13 million tons. Thus the USSR has joined the Chinese People's Republic as a major importer of grain.

Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia normally exported grain (12% of her 1913 gross output was exported), and Stolypin's agrarian reforms, which created a class of peasant landowners, had increased gross agricultural output by one-third between 1900 and 1913.

Exports of grain were irregular and generally negligible between 1917 and 1954. In the early years of the Virgin Lands

program, grain production spurted upward, and exports of grain increased correspondingly, exports of wheat (the principal grain) exports reaching 6 million tons in 1953, and total grain exports reaching a high of 7.8 million tons (of which 4.8 million were wheat) in 1962; average annual total grain exports from 1909 to 1914 were 10.5 million tons. The high production figures between 1954 and 1958 resulted from unusually favorable weather conditions and even more, from what can only be described as the extractive mining of new soils. The Soviets were using up fertility much faster than they were restoring it with fertilizers. By 1962, affairs had already reached a crisis after several years of diminishing returns, and the regime was resorting to the expedient of plowing the fallow lands, abandoning even that slow, age-old method of restoring fertility. Exports remained high in 1962, not because crops had been successful, but because foreign exchange was needed and because a false front had to be maintained. It is quite possible that the attempt to gain a far-reaching political triumph by shipping missiles to Cuba represented Khrushchev's last desperate throw of the dice before yielding to the necessity to divert funds and resources from arms to fertilizer production. Current Soviet purchases of grain with gold represent a major drain on the whole Soviet economy, since its import costs of producing gold in Northeast Siberia are much higher than in other gold producing areas such as South Africa, and since gold sells at \$35 an ounce on the world market.

Communist China's position has been still more desperate. In the 1930's China, which had been overpopulated for centuries, was already importing grain. After the Communist takeover, the regime succeeded for a time in forcing an average annual net export figure of 1.5 million tons; this did not reflect any increase in the availability of grain, but rather reduced domestic consumption, imposed because of the need for foreign exchange to finance the industrialization program. Then the commune system was introduced, accompanied by foolish experiments, such as deep plowing and backyard blast furnaces. Output in 1960 was 40% below the claimed harvest of 1958, and the latter figure itself was probably fictitious. Improvement since has been microscopic. In 1961 China began importing grain, and from 1961 to May 1963, she purchased a total of 17 million tons, of which 2 million tons was re-exported for political purposes. Recently, Peking contracted to purchase 3 to 5 million tons from Canada over a three year period beginning 1 August 1963, i.e at least 1 million tons per year. Purchases from Australia will probably be much larger; over 3 million tons have been imported from Australia so far this year. Such purchases of course diminish the amount of badly-needed industrial equipment the Chinese can buy abroad.

The East European satellite countries present another illustration of the damage Communism inflicts on agricultural output. Even according to official figures, Hungary has never recovered its prewar level of wheat production, and Czechoslovakia barely holds her own. Prior to World War II, Eastern Europe was a food surplus area: between 1934 and 1938, Hungarian wheat exports averaged 430,000 tons per annum; Rumanian, 549,000 tons; and

Bulgarian, 99,000 tons. In 1957, however, the USSR exported 5.9 million tons of grain to the European satellites, following the difficulties of 1956. Soviet wheat exports to Bloc countries, excluding China and Cuba, were: 1956 -- 548,000 tons; 1957 -- 4.6 million tons; 1958 -- 2.8 million tons; 1959 -- 4.4 million tons; 1960 -- 4.2 million tons; 1961 -- 3 million tons.

Now, with the Soviet crop failure, these countries too have had to turn to the non-Communist world; only Rumania was in a position to help the Soviets out, with 400,000 tons of wheat. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary are now seeking \$60 million worth of wheat from the United States, and Canada announced on 8 October that it would sell 300,000 tons to Bulgaria. In 1960, the Soviet Union began shipping wheat to Cuba with 57,000 tons; in 1961, the figure had risen to 192,000 tons; and in 1962, it was 292,000 tons. This year, Cuba will be provided with 465,000 tons of wheat, purchased by the Soviets from Canada. Recent hurricane damage will probably make additional shipments to Cuba necessary.

Thus today the picture of Communist agriculture is one of documented, unmitigated failure. Even when temporary increases have been gained, they have usually failed to keep pace with expanding populations. Now Khrushchev's past agricultural policies have openly gone bankrupt. It would be possible for some countries to do as England did in the nineteenth century, and count on buying agricultural imports with industrial exports, but although the Communist countries have always favored industry over agriculture, they have not developed salable manufactures for export, and they have tried to be self-sufficient. They have never made their agriculture efficient -- it takes seven Soviet farmhands to produce the amount of wheat produced by one American. Industrialization is all very well (though in the USSR it too is lagging, with the growth rate down to 4%), but a first essential for any society is to have enough to eat. With populations growing by leaps and bounds the world over, humanity cannot afford the continuance of Communist agricultural policies.

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707 EE.g. Echoes of Pan-Slavism

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"Generally it is far better to have no history at all than to keep up in the people the inclination to falsehood. It is false piety to wish to cover up the errors of our forefathers; the only means of honoring the memory of our fathers consists of abandoning their mistakes." (Ernest Denis, La Boheme depuis la Montagne-Blanche; Paris: 1902-3)

BACKGROUND: During his recent trip to Yugoslavia, Soviet Premier Khrushchev made a speech (at the Rakovica engine and tractor factory, 21 August 1963) in which he quoted the words of the 19th century poet and Bishop of Montenegro, Peter Njegos:

"...The Russians are one with us in faith and love: they love us and we love them.... we know full well that if the Russians perish all the other Slavs will perish too, and he who is against the Russians is against all Slavs."

"We communists" -- Khrushchev added -- "build the friendship of our peoples according to a different standard..., the class standard, but at that time the unity of the Slavic peoples had a positive and progressive significance."

On 29 August, Zeri I Popullit, the Albanian Communist daily, obviously stimulated by Khrushchev's allusions to Pan-slavism, carried the following rejoinder in an article entitled "The Revisionist Khrushchev in the role of Panslavist."

"Certainly this is not just historic reminiscence or random talk. We are here face to face with a new aspect of modern revisionism which replaces proletarian internationalism by the ideology of racism.... by the narrow concept of a unity based on the ethnic origin of a certain group of peoples.... He has come out openly in the role of Pan-Slavist. In the mouth of a chauvinist-revisionist, these remarks about the unity and fraternity of the Slav peoples have a definite political implication. By means of this demagogy borrowed from the arsenal of the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie but brightened up with modern colors, the Khrushchev group is trying to deceive the Slav peoples in the socialist countries and the peoples of Yugoslavia in order in the name of Slav unity to tie them more closely to its own policy."

A few weeks later, Todor Zhivkov, Bulgarian Communist chief, addressed the Slavist Congress in Sofia in these words:

"Owing to historical circumstances, all Slav peoples are now building communist and socialist societies. Despite the fact that there are national peculiarities in the culture of each Slav people, the essential character of this culture is socialist and, thanks to the prerequisites in our countries, this culture is developing very rapidly."

Although Zhivkov went on to deny that the construction of socialist society could be a "national, a tribal or racial peculiarity," the implication was clear.

The term "Panslavism" was first used by a Slovak, Jan Herkel in a work published in Budapest in 1826. The term was coined -- it should be noted -- by a Western Slav rather than a Russian. Essentially Panslavism arose as a defense mechanism of the Western Slavs, a product of the political awakening of intellectuals in eastern Europe, caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Panslavism had its origin not in nationalism and liberalism but in the French Revolution, Romantic poetry and German idealistic philosophy. An 18th century German romantic philosopher and poet, Johann Gottfried Herder first made the Slavs conscious of their linguistic and ethnic identity. To mid-nineteenth century Poles whose country was divided among Russia, Prussia and Austria, to Ukrainians subject to Russia and Austria, to Croats and Serbs under Austrian and Turkish domination, to Czechs and Slovenes who were part of Austria, to Slovaks incorporated in Hungary and to Bulgars revolting against 400 years of Turkish yoke, the metaphysics of Herder and his disciples were an irresistible attraction. More the product of philosophical speculation than historic fact, they inspired Slav historians to discover for them an historical foundation and Slav politicians and patriots to create a world in their image.

Russia, on the other hand, at the beginning of the 19th century, had very little interest in Panslavism. Rather, Russian expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries was motivated by great Russian aspirations and by the ideology of Orthodox christianity (Moscow -- "The Third Rome"). It was the non-Russian Slav world, actually, which -- in the throes of renascent nationalism -- looked for leadership to Russia, the only independent Slav state. In the second half of the 19th century, both as an answer to the rise of a powerful German empire and as an aggressive and messianic challenge to Western civilization, Panslavism had powerful and articulate advocates in Russia itself and was, on occasion, supported by popular opinion. However, Panslavism came increasingly into conflict with nationalism, the most potent force of the 19th century, and the more aware the various Slav peoples became of their individual and local historic traditions, the less they were inclined to sacrifice them on behalf of mythical common precedents or future glories. Geographic, historic, political and

religious realities all ran counter to Pan Slavic aspirations. Actually, Slavs have probably fought more among themselves than they have with non-Slavs.

Soviet Russia, for its part, despite the cloak of an internationalist ideology, has continued to emphasize the rise and predominance of Russian national elements. Until the 1930's, Russian chauvinism was officially combatted as a "Tsarist" heritage. In 1923, in his "Report on National Factors in Party and State," Stalin put the case clearly:

"Great power chauvinism is growing in our country daily and hourly -- Great power chauvinism, the rankest kind of nationalism, which strives to obliterate all that is not Russian, to gather together all the threads of administration into the hands of Russians and to crush everything that is not Russian."

In 1934, however, directing the rewriting of Russia's history, Stalin re-introduced the old nationalist concept of the original and unique character of the Russian heritage and attacked those Soviet writers who were so un-patriotic as to suggest that Russia's history followed a pattern of development common to a number of societies. Thus, from the mid-1930's on, Stalin simultaneously appealed to "socialist class struggle" and to traditional Russian nationalism. In 1914 Tsarist propaganda claimed that Russia had entered the war at least partly in defense of a small Slav nation; yet it did not officially resort to Pan Slavism as a propaganda theme. In World War II, it was only after his Nazi ally had turned on him, that Stalin, who had forgotten about his Slav brothers when they were suffering under German occupation, appealed to Pan Slavism. This was the first time that Pan Slavism had actually been propagated by Moscow as an official doctrine. At this time (Nov 6, 1941) in his report to the Moscow Soviet, Stalin stated:

"Hitler is intent on exterminating the Slav peoples: Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgars, Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians."

And at a banquet for the victorious Red Army Commanders in May 1945, Stalin proposed the following toast:

"I should like to drink to the health of our Soviet people, and, first of all, to the Russian people. I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming a part of the Soviet Union...it has earned a general recognition in this war as a leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country..."

It is significant that in Soviet Russia, World War II is known as the "Great Patriotic War" rather than the "War for the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland," or some similar title.

Soviet Russia, after 30 years of Bolshevism, reverted to the perennial nationalist and expansionist aspirations of Tsarist Russia. By 1947, the Slav world was united for the first time under the control of the Great Russian people; by 1948, however, with the defection of Yugoslavia, it was again foundering on the shoals of national diversities.

While Khrushchev, as compared with Stalin, has de-emphasized Russia's internationalist, Panslavic and messianic mission, the traditional Tsarist myth of Russia's "historic destiny" -- as Khrushchev's Belgrade speech demonstrates -- continues to be an integral part of Soviet-Russian foreign policy.

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

May-June 1968

Indian Communism in Turmoil

by Harry Gelman

EDITORS' NOTE: In a previous article for this journal ("The Indian CP Between Moscow and Peking," No.6, 1962), Mr. Harry Gelman examined the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the internal unity of the Indian party. Here, he brings the story up to date, showing how later developments in that conflict have split the CPI wide open, leaving it temporarily under control of the pro-Soviet faction.

IN MID-OCTOBER of 1962, on the eve of the Chinese military offensive in India, the Communist Party of India (CPI) was in perilous straits. Though its position as the second largest party in India had been reaffirmed in the national elections only eight months before, the CPI was desperately divided. On one hand was the right-wing majority faction of the party, led by the new party chairman, S. A. Dange: this faction was still fairly loyal to the CPSU; it was willing to serve Soviet foreign policy interests by preserving a moderate line toward the "national bourgeois" government of Prime Minister Nehru; and it was anxious for the party to take a position on the Sino-Indian border dispute which would not isolate it from outraged Indian nationalist opinion. On the other side was a powerful left-wing minority, well represented in the central party organs, and particularly well entrenched in control of certain provincial party committees (such as those of West Bengal and Punjab) which through long habits of CPI indiscipline had become de facto independent kingdoms supporting policies often incompatible with those of the central party leadership. The left faction was by now vociferous in its criticism of the CPSU and its expression of sympathy for the CCP; it was openly sympathetic toward the hard, militant line on Nehru urged by Peking; and it was adamant in refusing to admit that "socialist China could commit aggressions," no matter what this refusal cost the CPI. The tension within the party seemed such that a dramatic worsening of either the Sino-Soviet or the Sino-Indian conflicts might be the start of an open party split.

Both conflicts indeed worsened dramatically in late October: and the beginnings of a split in the Indian party have since then become discernible.

THE CHINESE GENERAL ATTACK in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh areas on October 20 marked a watershed

for the CPI, both in its attitude toward the Nehru government and in its relations with the world Communist movement. For the time being, this event left the CPI no more room for equivocation. If the party did not issue a forthright condemnation of Peking and pledge of support for the national government, it could expect most of the popular support it had painfully built up over the last decade to disappear rapidly; quite possible, the party itself might lose legal status. Right-wing CPI leaders such as Dange and provincial party committees led by the rightist faction therefore responded immediately with public denunciations of the Chinese aggression; but the CPI itself did not take an official stand until the party's National Council issued a resolution on November 1. During the twelve days between October 20 and November 1 two momentous events occurred to affect that resolution.

First, on October 22, the Cuban crisis began, and the Soviet Union apparently saw an overriding emergency touching on Soviet interest more vital than the need to preserve the Soviet position in India. On October 25, for the first and last time in three years of Sino-Indian border controversy, Pravda published an editorial siding with Peking. This editorial implied doubt of the validity of the MacMahon line as the border in the NEFA area, explicitly praised and endorsed the Chinese proposals for a ceasefire, opposed preconditions for a ceasefire (on which New Delhi was insisting) and called on Indian "progressives" (i.e., the CPI) to restrain themselves and their government. It seems likely that Moscow took this drastic step as a gesture seeking bloc solidarity at a time of military crisis. It is possible that a subsidiary motive, however, was a Soviet hope to buy Chinese forbearance in the event that a backdown on Cuba became necessary.

If the Soviets did entertain such a hope, it quickly proved illusory, for when Khrushchev did back down over Cuba the Chinese proceeded to scourge him unmercifully in their propaganda as an appeaser; they continue to do so to the present day. In the meantime, the Chinese made it plain that the gesture of appeasement the USSR had made toward them over India was entirely insufficient. On October 27 Jen-min jih-pao printed an editorial attack on "Nehru's philosophy" which went much further than an editorial on this subject published by the Chinese party organ in May 1959, shortly after the Tibetan revolt. Whereas in the earlier case Nehru had been depicted condescendingly as a confused and vacillating leader whose policy was nevertheless "generally favorable," now he was said to have acted all along as a conscious agent of "reactionaries" and "imperialism" on really important questions of domestic and foreign policy. The Indian Communist Party was sternly admonished not to "trail behind" this reprobate by echoing his accusations against Peking, and S.A. Dange was derogated as a "so-called" Marxist-Leninist for having done so. Finally,

with regard to the Soviet Union, the editorial made it clear that nothing short of a direct condemnation of Nehru and India (which Pravda of October 25 had not contained) would satisfy Peking's conception of "proletarian internationalism"² that what was being demanded of Khrushchev, in fact, was the total abandonment of his India policy, of the fruits of eight years of Soviet cultivation of the Indian population and the Indian "national bourgeoisie."

Thus, by the end of October, Moscow could see that it had blundered. It had jeopardized its position in the eyes of the Indian public to no good purpose; Peking was not appeased over Soviet policy toward India and had not been restrained from launching violent attacks on Soviet actions over Cuba. Accordingly, in a November 5 Pravda editorial and in subsequent Soviet comment, Moscow proceeded to edge away from the partial support it had given Peking on October 25 and to reassume its earlier position.

THE INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, meanwhile fought a momentous internal battle in the last week of October, as a result of which it disregarded the public advice given it by both Moscow and Peking and adopted a position unacceptable even to the CPSU. Dange's supporters in the National Council forced through a resolution which condemned Peking unequivocally and called on Indians to unite behind Nehru "in defense of the motherland against Chinese aggression." Although Pravda of October 25 had asked the CPI not to do this, such a statement may have been regarded by Moscow as inevitable. The CPI resolution went on, however, to say that the party was not opposed to India's "buying arms from any country on a commercial basis," and this Moscow could not stomach. By endorsing the acceptance of military aid from the "imperialist" West against Communist China, the CPI soon found itself at odds with many of Moscow's European adherents. For example, the British party, former mentor of the CPI, in October and November took a more and more openly anti-Indian position; the Czech party at first went so far as to repeat Peking's story that India had launched an "extensive offensive" on October 20,³ and as late as November 8 was continuing to attack the validity of the MacMahon Line;⁴ and even the revisionist Italian party complained that "we fail to understand easily the position of the Indian Communist Party."⁵

Meanwhile, however, Moscow's retreat of November back toward a public posture of neutrality helped to make the CPI's domestic position more tolerable, and the Dange leadership hastened to fortify itself at home and defend itself abroad. On the very next day, it was announced that Dange had had a talk with Nehru in which he outlined to the Prime Minister the National Council resolution and assured Nehru of the CPI's support. A few days later, the CPI weekly organ published a pugnacious defense of the Indian party leadership against the

attack made by Jen-min jih-pao on October 27; the Chinese were accused of "national chauvinism," and of having made a blatant appeal for Dange's overthrow on the eve of the National Council meeting.⁶ At the same time, the CPI was reported to have written to all Communist parties of the world defending its position and asking for support.⁷

BY THIS TIME--early November--the central CPI leadership was at last firmly in Dange's hands, and the recalcitrant provincial party organizations were soon to succumb as well. Although the vacillating CPI General Secretary, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, apparently refused to sign the party resolution of November 1 (as Jen-min jih-pao carefully noted), he was isolated and powerless; the three leading left-faction spokesmen on the Central Secretariat had resigned following the passage of the resolution. While it was the pressure of Indian public opinion upon the party that pushed the leftists out of the central CPI machinery, Dange apparently owed it to the Indian government that these leftists lost their organizational position in the provinces. On November 7, the day after Dange spoke to Nehru, and again on November 21, the government made large-scale arrests of CPI cadres; the overwhelming majority of those arrested were leaders of the left-wing faction in New Delhi and in the provinces who had opposed or who had shown a lack of enthusiasm for the National Council resolution. Jen-min jih-pao has furnished its own comment on what happened next:

"The Dange clique exploited the situation and sent their trusted followers, on the heels of the police, to take over the leading organs of the party committees in a number of states. The purpose of these actions by Dange was to reconstitute the Indian Communist Party and wreck the Indian revolutionary movement so as to serve the ends of the big bourgeoisie!"⁸

In November and December the right-wing faction apparently did in fact take advantage of the sudden departure of the leftists to seize the party machinery for the first time in the left-wing strongholds of West Bengal and the Punjab, and to consolidate its dominant position everywhere else. This action seems to have evoked countermeasures on the part of the party's left-wing which may mark the beginning of an organizational split in the CPI. In the Punjab, the leftist provincial party first secretary, before being arrested, is said to have left instructions to his followers not to cooperate with the new provincial party leadership, and to have warned "against certain weak links in the party" who "would speak the language of the government."⁹ In West Bengal, an "underground" center is said to have come into being which similarly instructed party units to refuse to cooperate with the "usurping" right-wing leaders of the provincial party organization; according to the Indian press, many local party units in West Bengal have in fact maintained contact with this "underground" center and have refused allegiance to the official party organization.¹⁰ The

new management of the West Bengal party newspaper Swadhinata complained publicly that the outgoing leftist leaders had taken the organization's funds with them, mortgaged the Swadhinata presses, and left the newspaper in a financial and legal predicament in which it would be difficult to continue publication.¹¹

Peking, of course, has sought to blame the growing organizational division in the CPI on "Dange and company," who are said to have "used the power of the Indian ruling groups to push aside the people who disagree with them...and to split the party wide open."¹² At the same time, Peking's increasingly open calls in December, January and February for all "true Marxist-Leninists" to revolt against the policies and the "bator" of the CPSU were transparently designed to encourage factional strife in all Communist parties, including the CPI. As justification for its own position, the CPI leadership therefore eagerly reprinted all the anti-Chinese statements made by various Communist parties as the Sino-Soviet polemic expanded, including Ulbricht's lament at the East German congress that the "Chinese comrades" had not adhered to peaceful coexistence "in dealing with frontier questions with India."

MOSCOW, however, was by no means happy at the prospect of a formal split in the CPI, and particularly unhappy at the means by which it was being brought about. While remaining careful not to jeopardize relations with New Delhi, the Soviet press repeatedly protested the jailing of CPI members (particularly that of General Secretary Nambudiripad, who was detained for a week in late November). On December 30, a Pravda writer deplored "attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Communist Party," citing a statement by an Indian Minister who was said to have declared that "the Communist Party should clear its ranks of questionable elements." Such efforts "to divide the Communists into the 'pure' and impure," Pravda complained, are nothing "but an attempt to kindle internal strife within the Communist Party, to split it."

In the light of this situation, Dange in December undertook a trip to consult with Communist leaders in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Italy and Britain. Peking later claimed that Nehru and Indian Home Affairs Minister Shastri had briefed Dange before his departure, and that Dange had acted as an agent of New Delhi;¹³ it seems likely, however, that Dange's first concern, as always, was to defend the position of S.A. Dange, and to justify in his talks with Khrushchev the actions taken by the CPI under his leadership. It has been reported in the Indian press that Dange was not altogether successful in this--that Khrushchev remonstrated against the National Council resolution as being unnecessarily blatant in condemning Chinese aggression, and that he criticized the CPI for not sufficiently qualifying its support of Nehru.¹⁴ After Dange's return, he reported first to Nehru, and then to the CPI Central Executive

Committee. The latter seemed to be responding to advice brought from abroad when on January 12 it adopted a resolution which, while continuing to support the bargaining position of the Indian government and to place the onus for agreement upon Peking, put greatly increased emphasis on the need for a peaceful settlement and on the "dangerous machinations of the Western powers."¹⁵

This shift in the emphasis of the CPI line was reiterated in resolutions adopted by the party's National Council in February. At the same time, the National Council finally put the CPI on public record with a formal, unequivocal denunciation of the Chinese party's position in the Sino-Soviet conflict.¹⁶ Finally, it was at this National Council meeting that Namboodiripad, already isolated within the leadership, resigned as CPI General Secretary and editor of New Age, leaving Dange's forces in sole control.

THAT MOSCOW has come to feel, however, that some of the CPI's right-faction leaders have carried a compliant attitude toward Nehru too far was demonstrated when the March 1963 issue of the Soviet-controlled international Communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, published a review article by Namboodiripad (identified now as merely a "member of the CPI Central Secretariat"). In this article Namboodiripad--and presumably the CPSU--reiterated the basic Soviet thesis that the Indian bourgeoisie had "not exhausted its progressive role," but also emphasized the need to support the Nehru government only when it did well, criticizing it when it misbehaved. Namboodiripad chided "some comrades" for believing it possible simply to "walk in step with the government."

For Peking, of course, the matter is much more simple; and Jen-min jih-pao on March 9 made its position plain with an editorial denouncing the CPI leadership in the most violent terms to date, condemning Dange as a Titoite revisionist who was now beyond the Communist pale and as a traitor who had split the CPI by capitulating to Nehru and the Indian bourgeoisie.

Despite Moscow's apparent desire to restrain it, the right-wing faction now at last seems in firm possession of the machinery of the Communist Party of India throughout the country, while the leftist faction---its top leaders imprisoned---reportedly is vigorously contesting authority of the new leadership in certain areas. It remains to be seen whether the leftists will eventually go on to create and announce a second Communist Party in India, as has already happened in Brazil. At the moment (late March) both the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian conflicts are in a phase of relative quiescence; should either be reactivated, the development of a formal schism in the CPI may be expected to accelerate.

¹Chairman Dange thus became the second CPI leader to be so honored in a Jen-min jih-pao editorial, the first having been the late general secretary Ajoy Ghosh, on Dec. 7, 1961.

²This was spelled out still more forcefully by Chou Enlai in a speech on November 4, when he thanked the North Koreans for "upholding the stand of proletarian internationalism"; this he defined as "distinguishing right from wrong, upholding justice, denouncing the Indian aggression against China, supporting China's counterattacks in self-defense," and supporting China's proposals for a border settlement. (NCMA, November 4, 1962)

³Prague radio, October 25, 1962.

⁴Prague radio, November 8, 1962.

⁵Mario Alicata in Unità (Rome), November 11, 1962.

⁶New Age (New Delhi), November 11, 1962. In another article in the same issue, Dange himself wrote that the CPI would help defend the country because Communists are committed to defend "just wars." The usual Communist criterion for a "just war," of course, would require Dange to do exactly the opposite.

⁷Statesman (New Delhi), November 16, 1962.

⁸Jen-min jih-pao, March 9, 1963. The Chinese here went so far as to suggest that the Indian government acted "on a list of names previously furnished to it" by Dange.

⁹Link (New Delhi weekly), December 16, 1962.

¹⁰Ibid., December 23, 1962.

¹¹Ibid.; Swadhinata, December 12 and 27, 1962; Statesman, January 9, 1963.

¹²Jen-min jih-pao, March 9, 1963.

¹³Ibid., January 15, 1963.

¹⁴Thought (New Delhi weekly), December 29, 1962.

¹⁵New Age, January 20, 1963. The TASS account of the resolution leaned heavily on the latter aspect of the statement.

¹⁶New Age, February 17, 1963.